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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   
  hen the Department of Defense (DoD) issued its Law of War Manual in 
June of 20151—an effort decades in the making—it is clear that it anticipat-
ed criticism. For an organization not especially disposed to be humble about 
its accomplishments, it made a surprising invitation in the text for “com-
ments and suggestions.”2 Several experts (and other pundits) have taken up 
                                                                                                                      
 Major General, USAF (Ret.), Professor of the Practice of Law and Executive Direc-
tor of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security at Duke University School of Law, 
https://law.duke.edu/fac/dunlap/. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of 
the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College. 
1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 1.1.1 (2015) [hereinafter 
DOD MANUAL].  
2. Id. at vi. 
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that offer, and have done so publically. Indeed, two major nation-
al/international security law-focused blogs, Just Security3 and Lawfare,4 created 
sections within their websites devoted to the Manual.  
Many observers had been concerned about what the final product 
might look like. Hays Parks, the now-retired Marine and long-time DoD 
lawyer whom most experts consider to be his generation’s dean of law of 
war specialists, shepherded the project for almost three quarters of its two-
decade development, and had expected it to be fielded sometime in 2010.5 
However, progress on the Manual was abruptly halted that year when the 
Department of Defense decided to re-engage the inter-agency process, re-
portedly in deference to some political appointees in the Obama Admin-
istration who “aggressively sought changes in the DoD Manual to conform 
to their political philosophies or legal arguments in detainee litigation.”6 
This led to fears by Parks and others that the final document would be 
mired in politics and reflect incorrect interpretations of the law that could 
“endanger the lives of [U.S.] fighting men and women.”7 
Those fears appear to have been largely avoided in the Manual, not-
withstanding other criticisms that have arisen. The purpose of this article is 
to examine some of those critiques, and to offer, where appropriate, coun-
ters to those assessments, as well as suggestions as to how the Manual 
might be improved. Although this article does not purport to be a compre-
hensive examination of every aspect of the Manual or, for that matter, a 
response to every criticism that has been lodged against it, I nevertheless 
conclude that on balance the Manual provides an excellent, comprehensive 
and much-needed statement of the U.S. Department of Defense’s view of 
                                                                                                                      
3. A Reader’s Guide to Our Mini-Forum on DOD’s New Law of War Manual, JUST SECURI-
TY (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/25371/readers-guide-mini-forum-dods-
law-war-Manual/.  
4. 2015 Defense Department Law of War Manual, By Chapter, LAWFARE, https://www.law 
fareblog.com/2015-defense-department-law-war-manual-chapter (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015). 
5. Hays Parks, National Security Law in Practice: The Department of Defense Law of 
War Manual, Speech to the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and 
National Security (Nov. 18, 2010), http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/aba-
speech-11082010-final-as-given.pdf. 
6. Edwin Williamson & Hays Parks, Where Is the Law of War Manual?, THE WEEKLY 
STANDARD (July 22, 2013), http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/where-law-war-
Manual_739267.html.  
7. Id. 
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the lex lata of the law of war.8 Consequently, with a few exceptions, what 
follows is generally a defense of the Manual pertaining to several issues that 
have proven to be contentious. 
 
II. HUMAN SHIELDS 
 
One of the most energetic and derisive of the Manual’s early critics is Pro-
fessor Adil Ahmad Haque of Rutgers University (Newark) School of Law.9 
Just weeks after its release, he alleged on the Just Security blog that based on 
his reading of the text, the DoD “apparently thinks that it may lawfully kill 
an unlimited number of civilians forced to serve as involuntary human 
shields in order to achieve even a trivial military advantage.”10  
I responded by arguing a number of points, beginning by dismissing 
Haque’s interpretation of what he thinks the Manual asserts.11 What the 
Manual actually says about human shields is to repeatedly make the point 
that using them is prohibited by international law. It reflects the indisputa-
ble axiom that “civilians must not be used as shields or as hostages.”12 It 
further makes it clear that civilians, including human shields, must not be 
made the object of an attack.13 
Importantly, contrary to what Haque’s post suggests, the Manual does 
not exempt the U.S. military from the affirmative duty “to take feasible pre-
cautions to reduce the risk of harm to the civilian population and other 
protected persons and objects” and to incorporate such precautions “when 
planning and conducting” attacks.14 More specifically, the Manual insists 
that “wanton disregard for civilian casualties or harm to other protected 
persons and objects is clearly prohibited.”15 
                                                                                                                      
8. See, however, notes 151 and 152, infra, and accompanying text (arguing that the 
Manual, by its own terms, does not necessarily speak for the entire U.S. government). 
9. Faculty Profile: Professor Adil Ahmad Haque, RUTGERS LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.rutgers.edu/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
10. Adil Ahmad Haque, The Defense Department’s Indefensible Position on Killing Human 
Shields, JUST SECURITY (June 22, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24077/human-
shields-law-war-Manual/. 
11. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Human Shields and the DOD Law of War Manual: Can’t We 
Improve the Debate?, JUST SECURITY (June 25, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24199/ 
human-shields-dod-law-war-Manual-cant-improve-debate/. This section is largely taken 
from that blogpost. 
12. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2.5.3.3, 5.16.3, 10.5.1.4, 11.6.1. 
13. Id. ¶ 5.3.2. 
14. Id. ¶ 5.3.3. 
15. Id. ¶ 5.3.3.2. 
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The Manual does recognize that “in some cases, a party to a conflict 
may attempt to use the presence or movement of the civilian population or 
individual civilians in order to shield military objectives from seizure or at-
tack.”16 It counsels however—and this is critical—that when “enemy persons 
engage in such behavior, commanders should continue to seek to discrimi-
nate in conducting attacks and to take feasible precautions to reduce the 
risk of harm to the civilian population and civilian objects”17  
Regarding, human shields in particular, the Manual states: 
 
Harm to Human Shields. Use of human shields violates the rule that civil-
ians may not be used to shield, favor, or impede military operations. The 
party that employs human shields in an attempt to shield military objec-
tives from attack assumes responsibility for their injury, provided that the at-
tacker takes feasible precautions in conducting its attack.  
 
If the proportionality rule were interpreted to permit the use of human 
shields to prohibit attacks, such an interpretation would perversely encourage the 
use of human shields and allow violations by the defending force to increase 
the legal obligations on the attacking force.18 
 
So Haque’s overstated accusation is legally deficient as there are plenty of 
precautions aimed at protecting civilians memorialized in the Manual’s text. 
I also suggested that regardless of where one might stand on the Manual, 
should we not all be concerned that nowhere in his legal analysis does 
Haque even mention “feasible precautions” despite it being embedded (re-
peatedly) in the Manual as a legal requirement? I asked, rhetorically, is that 
not a pretty significant omission? And, of course, it is. 
Haque dismisses DoD’s common-sense view that allowing unscrupu-
lous defenders to succeed in deterring attacks through the use of human 
shields would “perversely encourage the use of human shields.” He con-
tends that: 
 
[A]ttacking combatants despite the presence of involuntary shields will 
not make those combatants any worse off than they would have been 
without those shields. On the contrary, if defending forces expect addi-
                                                                                                                      
16. Id. ¶ 5.5.4. 
17. Id. (emphasis added). 
18. Id. ¶ 5.12.3.3 (emphasis added). 
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tional (say, political) benefits and no additional costs from using involun-
tary shields then killing these involuntary shields will not deter their use.19 
 
If you accept this logic, then you are buying into the idea that even if targets 
come to accept that they will not be protected from attack by surrounding themselves with 
human shields, they will nevertheless continue to burden themselves by ac-
quiring, guarding, feeding, housing and otherwise supporting human 
shields. Moreover, they will do so even though the very presence of human 
shields increases their “footprint” (and therefore their chances of being 
detected by a variety of surveillance capabilities), diminishes their own rep-
utation for fearlessness, risks strategic “backfire,”20 hardens public opinion 
against them21 and can put them in conflict with religious beliefs.22 In truth, 
there are considerable costs to keeping human shields, especially under cir-
cumstances where they would not, in fact, actually constitute a shield. 
Nevertheless, Haque speculates that targets still would perceive that 
they could “expect” additional “political” benefits from keeping human 
shields, presumably from propagandizing those who might be killed in 
strikes. This is wrong for two reasons: one, thanks to advances in technol-
ogy, targets can no longer assume that simply being close to civilians will 
mean that civilians will die in an attack (consider that even though terrorists 
targeted in drone operations have tried to do just that, civilian casualties 
from drone strikes are actually rare these days23); and, secondly, even when 
hostages are killed in attacks (as was the case in 2015), public support for 
such strikes remains strong despite concerns among the populace that the 
attacks could endanger the lives of innocent Americans.24 
                                                                                                                      
19. Haque, The Defense Department’s Indefensible Position, supra note 10. 
20. Rod Norland, ISIS Tactics Questioned as Hostages Dwindle, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 1, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/middleeast/isis-tactics-questioned-
as-hostages-dwindle.html?_r=2. 
21. Molly Guinness, Hostage Taking Has Paid in the Past—But it Has Won ISIS Nothing, 
THE SPECTATOR (Sept. 14, 2014), http://blogs.new.spectator.co.uk/2014/09/hostage-
taking-has-paid-in-the-past-but-it-has-won-isis-nothing/. 
22. Taking Hostages and Killing Them is Un-Islamic, ISLAM 101, http://www.islam101. 
com/terror/hostages.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2016). 
23. William Saletan, Don’t Blame Drones, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.slate. 
com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/04/u_s_drone_strikes_civilian_casualti
es_would_be_much_higher_without_them.1.html. 
24. Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: U.S. POLITICS 
& POLICY (May 28, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-continues-
to-back-u-s-drone-attacks/. 
 
 
 
The DoD Law of War Manual and its Critics Vol. 92 
 
90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his responses to my critique, Haque argues that I have a “utilitarian 
argument” as to the importance of avoiding incentivizing an enemy to use 
human shields.25 Not so, except perhaps to say I see great utility in not al-
lowing the law of war (LoW) to incentivize activities that put civilians at 
risk. In my view one of the underlying purposes of the LoW is, as the Man-
ual puts it, “protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from un-
necessary suffering,”26 and it should be interpreted towards that end. I dis-
agree with Haque’s conclusion that the LoW mandates allowing a belliger-
ent unimpeded use of human shields, subject only to some theoretical af-
ter-the-fact accountability for war crimes. 
In fact, I believe it is not improper for an attacker to consider the pro-
tection of civilians as well as the importance of maintaining adherence to 
the LoW as part of the “definite military advantage sought” in conducting a 
proportionality analysis.27 Along this line, the Manual notes that the Final 
Report of the Persian Gulf War concluded that military advantage “is not 
restricted to tactical gains, but is linked to the full context of a war strategy, 
in this instance, the execution of the Coalition war plan for liberation of 
Kuwait.” 28 
Acting to preserve the LoW operates broadly as a strategy not just as a 
philosophical good, but also a very practical way to deny the enemy the 
ability to effectively use human shields as a method of warfare in its military operations. 
Doing so offers a definite military advantage to the attacker—not to men-
tion civilians—over the longer term. Importantly, as the Manual makes 
clear, international law does not require that the “advantage” be “immedi-
                                                                                                                      
25. Adil Ahmad Haque, Human Shields and Proportionality: A Reply to Charlie Dunlap, 
JUST SECURITY (June 26, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24233/human-shields-
reply-charlie-dunlap/.  
26. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶¶ 2.5.3.3, 5.16.3, 10.5.1.4, 11.6.1. 
27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 57(3), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]. 
28. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.7.7.3 n.170.  
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ate,”29 and that advantage is “not restricted to immediate tactical gains, but 
may be assessed in the full context of the war strategy.”30 
We can never forget that voluntary and involuntary human shields un-
dermine the fundamental law of war principle of distinction and the pro-
tection of innocent civilians. The real issue is what works best to protect 
civilians? Here is where the Manual could be clearer. It would be better to 
explicitly point out that, as described above, when an attack is designed at 
least in part to deny an adversary the military advantage of using human 
shield as a method of warfare, that end constitutes a powerful strategic mili-
tary advantage for the attacker to seek and is, therefore, quite significant in 
determine what might be feasible in the protection of civilians.  
Subsequent to this colloquy, two more notable posts appeared on the 
Just Security blog about human shields. The first, with the very intriguing 
title Human Shields: Weapon of the Strong, is co-authored by Professor Neve 
Gordon, a political scientist at Ben-Gurion University, and Brown Univer-
sity anthropologist, Professor Nicola Perugini.31 In their essay they bring an 
extraordinarily useful interdisciplinary voice to the dialogue by critiquing 
both Haque and me by contending that we “both treat human shielding as 
an ahistorical phenomenon and therefore fail to address a much more fun-
damental question: Why does the Law of War Manual suddenly include 
clauses dealing with human shields?” 
They argue that “human shielding is not a new phenomenon” and go 
on to propose an answer to their own question by saying: 
 
                                                                                                                      
29. Id., ¶ 5.7.7.3 (citing J. Fred Buzhardt, DoD General Counsel, Letter to Senator 
Edward Kennedy, Sept. 22, 1972, reprinted in 67 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 122, 124 (1973)) (“Turning to the deficiencies in the Resolutions of the Institut de 
Droit International, and with the foregoing in view, it cannot be said that Paragraph 2, 
which refers to legal restraints that there must be an ‘immediate’ military advantage, re-
flects the law of armed conflict that has been adopted in the practices of States.”). 
30. Id., ¶ 5.7.7.3. (footnote omitted) (citing CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: 
FINAL REPORT ON TO CONGRESS 613 (1982) (“‘Military advantage’ is not restricted to 
tactical gains, but is linked to the full context of a war strategy, in this instance, the execu-
tion of the Coalition war plan for liberation of Kuwait.)”). See also WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, 
THE LAW OF TARGETING 189 n.70 (discussing the statement made by the UK in ratifying 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions); IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW OF TARGETING 64 (2009). 
31. Neve Gordon & Nicola Perugini, Human Shields: Weapon of the Strong, JUST SECU-
RITY (Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27005/human-shields-weapon-stro 
ng/.  
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Our counterintuitive hypothesis is that human shields are not only being 
deployed as a weapon of the weak against high tech states (the underlying 
assumption of both Haque and Dunlap), but that the legal phrase “hu-
man shield” has also been mobilized by strong states to legitimize the in-
creasing deaths of civilians on the battlefield.32 
 
Gordon and Perugini, who sponsored a workshop on this subject,33 are 
certainly correct in that human shields have been used in the past. Yet fre-
quency of a particular issue does matter when military manuals are being 
written. With respect to human shields, Professor Michael Schmitt in his 
work on the subject says the phenomenon is “endemic in contemporary 
conflict,”34 but also cites a quote from Jean Pictet’s 1958 commentaries on 
the Geneva Conventions, which said at that time that such instances were 
“fortunately rare.”35 Something rare in the past would logically and under-
standably be treated more extensively when it becomes “endemic” simply 
as a matter of military practicality as opposed to any nefarious reasons.  
Regardless, military professionals and others who would use the Manual 
would likely not be surprised as to why it addresses the phenomenon in 
more detail than did previous documents. Previous use of human shields 
just did not prove to be the deterrent to attack that they have become to-
day (this is likely why the instances were, in Pictet’s assessment, “rare”). 
Why the change? The truly unprecedented sensitivity to any civilian casual-
ties that we see in current operations simply did not exist in earlier eras. 
And that sensitivity is not, particularly, because of new legal impediments, 
per se, but because of policy restraints much beyond what the LoW requires. 
As I have discussed in War on the Rocks, the Obama Administration cre-
ated—and publicized—policy standards for the use of force in counterter-
rorism operation outside of what it calls “areas of active hostilities” that 
demand not just a determination (as international law would have it) that 
the expected casualties not be “excessive” in relation to the anticipated mil-
itary advantage, but rather a “near certainty” that no civilian casualties will 
                                                                                                                      
32. Id. 
33. The workshop, entitled “The Politics of Human Shielding” took place at Brown 
University (RI) on November 17, 2015. 
34. Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 38 ISRAEL 
YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 17, 18 (2008). 
35. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 208 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958). 
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occur.36 I observed in that essay that while human shields were “a serious 
violation of international law,” this was “hardly an impediment to al-
Qaeda, especially if violating it might ensure policy-induced protection 
against airstrikes or other uses of force.”37 Though the Administration said 
in the fall of 2014 that the restrictive policies would not apply to operations 
against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it appears that equally lim-
iting standards have nevertheless been in place.38 
Predictably, given the openly announced standards, today’s adversaries 
have concluded that using human shields will “work” because they as-
sume—for understandable reasons—that the human shields will protect 
them from attack, or if they are attacked, to give them a propaganda wind-
fall. As a Syrian activist recently put it, ISIS “uses civilians as human shields 
to claim that the U.S.-led coalition is targeting innocent people during the 
strikes.”39  
ISIS’s use of human shields is an expression of a version of what I call 
“lawfare,” whereby a party to a conflict creates the perception of illegality in 
order to serve a belligerent purpose.40 In other words, as opposed to Gor-
                                                                                                                      
36. Charles Dunlap, Civilian Casualties, Drones, Airstrikes and the Perils of Policy, WAR ON 
THE ROCKS (May 11, 2015), http://warontherocks.com/2015/05/civilian-casualties-
drones-airstrikes-and-the-perils-of-policy/ (citing Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and 
Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United 
States and Areas of Active Hostilities, White House, May 23, 2013, https://www.white 
house.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-
use-force-counterterrorism).  
37. Id. 
38. See Michael Isikoff, White House Exempts Syria Airstrikes from Tight Standards on Civil-
ian Deaths, YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/white-house-exempts-
syria-airstrikes-from-tight-standards-on-civilian-deaths-183724795.html. However, recent 
news reports indicate that very tight standards are, in fact, being applied: 
 
A senior American official said every air strike, whether conducted by a fighter jet or un-
manned aerial vehicle, night or day, must be cleared by an American general officer. In 
order to strike a building it has to be determined that it is “sole use ISIS,” meaning there 
must be certainty that the enemy is not co-mingling there with civilians. “We aim for zero 
collateral damage,” said one young officer in the CJOC. 
 
Justin Fishel, Martha Raddatz & Luis Martinez, Inside the US Command Center at the Front 
Lines of ISIS Fight, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International 
/inside-us-command-center-front-lines-isis-fight/story?id=35315658. 
39. Sarbaz Yousef, ISIS Uses Iraqi Civilians as Human Shields, Dozens Killed in U.S.-led 
Strike Near Kirkuk, ARA NEWS (June 2015), http://aranews.net/2015/06/isis-uses-iraqi-
civilians-as-human-shields-dozens-killed-in-u-s-led-strike-near-kirkuk/. 
40. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 823 (John 
Norton Moore, Guy B. Roberts & Robert F. Turner, eds., 3d ed. 2015). 
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don and Perugini’s interpretation of the discussion in the Manual, the use 
of human shields at various times in the past simply never developed into 
the reliably effective military tactic that needed to be addressed as it does 
today. The fact is that such abuse of civilians did not necessarily deter at-
tackers in earlier eras, and the employers of human shields were vulnerable 
to having their own people treated similarly. It rarely worked then; it often 
works now. 
Furthermore, the pervasiveness of twenty-first century information 
technologies simply did not exist in previous wars. Belligerents lacked the 
technical means to rapidly and effectively exploit the deaths of the human 
shields as easily as they can today. That reality, combined with the fact that 
in earlier eras human shields did not deter most attacks, can readily explain 
why human shields were not discussed as they are in the new Manual. Per-
sonally, I have never heard anyone—let alone a military professional—suggest 
anything remotely along the “legitimize civilian deaths” lines as Gordon 
and Perugini hypothesize. 
This raises a further issue with Gordon’s and Perugini’s hypothesis: the 
complete absence of any evidence that indicates any sort of norm is arising 
demonstrating that the so called “strong States” have “mobilized” the hu-
man shields phenomenon to “legitimize the increasing deaths of civilians 
on the battlefield.” That said, Gordon and Perugini may be extrapolating 
from their view of Israel’s operations in Gaza to a supposition about 
“strong States” more generally.41 
At the risk of oversimplification, my sense is that Gordon and Perugini 
have concluded that Israel has essentially declared the entire area of Gaza 
as one where all civilians are being actively used as human shields. This 
characterization, they seem to contend, has allowed Israel not only to de-
clare all civilian deaths as result of Israeli attacks the responsibility of the 
Hamas defenders for illegally using human shields, but also to permit Israel 
to relieve itself of the targeting precautions—to include any proportionality 
analysis—that the LoW would otherwise require in most circumstances. I 
do not read the DoD Manual as endorsing such a broad interpretation of 
human shielding, but I gather Gordon and Perugini do. 
                                                                                                                      
41. See, e.g., Neve Gordon & Nicola Perugini, On “Human Shielding” in Gaza, AL 
JAZEERA (July 18, 2014), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/07/human-
shielding-gaza-2014717154428830848.html.  
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To be clear, I am not necessarily agreeing with what seems to be their 
interpretation of Israel’s use of force in Gaza,42 but if accurate, Israeli ac-
tions would be hard to square with the law. Rather, I believe that even if 
true, Israel’s actions are not themselves enough to establish an international 
norm vis-à-vis human shields. Personally, I view much of the legal aspects 
of the Israeli-Palestinian situation as sui generis, and of limited LoW applica-
tion beyond its rather specific and unique circumstances. 
In any event, the United States has instituted policies—as wrong-
headed (albeit well-intended) as they may be—that are plainly just the op-
posite—that is, aimed at the quixotic goal of a “near certainty” of zero ci-
vilian deaths, not any “legitimization” of them. These overly restrictive pol-
icies—expressed in rules of engagement—have actually inhibited the appli-
cation of force against, for example ISIS, that would otherwise be permit-
ted by international law.43 
Moreover, it has always been the case since 9/11 that the vast majority 
of civilian casualties have not been caused by “strong States.” To the con-
trary, it is adversaries whose disregard for international law typically goes 
beyond merely the unlawful use of human shields that are overwhelmingly 
responsible. For example, in its August 2015 report about civilian deaths in 
Afghanistan, the UN “documented a 78 per cent increase in civilian casual-
ties attributed to Anti-Government Elements from complex and suicide 
attacks and a 57 per cent increase in civilian casualties from targeted kill-
                                                                                                                      
42. I find Schmitt’s analysis of Israeli targeting approaches generally more persuasive.  
See, e.g., Michael Schmitt, The Relationship Between Context and Proportionality: A Reply to Cohen 
and Shany, JUST SECURITY (May 11, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/22948/response-
cohen-shany/.  
43. See, e.g., John Hayward, Impossible Rules of Engagement: “Zero Civilian Casualties” in 
ISIS Battle, BREITBART (June 24, 2015). In addition, consider: 
 
In Iraq and Syria today, the US operates under a zero civilian casualty standard that far ex-
ceed the standards of international law. That policy is backfiring—it is extending the time 
to secure military objectives; allows more time for the Islamic State to commit atrocities; 
more radical Islamists to emerge out of Syria; and it yields the Islamic State the equivalent 
of an air defense capability they do not have to pay for, equip, or man to employ. Moreo-
ver, this excessive caution is sparking a crisis in confidence that has invited further vio-
lence emboldening others to take action not aligned with US interests. Russian interven-
tion in Syria is an obvious example, and the attacks in Paris are the most recent manifesta-
tion of a timid and feckless coalition strategy. 
 
David A. Deptula, We Can’t Stop the Islamic State with a “Desert Drizzle,” USA TODAY (Nov. 
15, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/11/15/we-cant-stop-islamic-st 
ate-desert-drizzle-column/75777004/. 
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ings.”44 The UN also “attributed 94 per cent of all civilian casualties from 
targeted killings to Anti-Government Elements.”45 
The facts are glaringly inapposite of Gordon’s and Perugini’s conten-
tions, and just do not support the idea that the United States as a “strong 
State” is responsible for “increasing deaths of civilians on the battlefield.”46 
Indeed, as grim as the statistics are, they serve as an empirical counterpoint 
to any supposed American effort at “legitimization” of civilian causalities. 
Indeed, it is evidence that the view of human shields as reflected in the 
Manual is not interpreted or used by U.S. forces to accomplish the nefari-
ous end Gordon and Perugini allege, notwithstanding whatever may be the 
case with the Israelis. 
The second of the new postings on this topic was by Haque himself.47 
While he applauded Gordon and Perugini’s essay, he went on to speculate 
that the current Manual approach to human shields is somehow sourced in 
a 1990 law review article authored by Hays Parks, the renowned LoW ex-
pert I mentioned above.48 Suffice to say, absent explicit evidence linking 
him to the Manual’s construct, I would not conclude that Parks—who re-
tired from the government in 2010 and who has declined to read the Manu-
al—had anything to do with drafting this section of it (even assuming 
Haque is correct in his analysis of the Parks article).49 As I have pointed out 
elsewhere,50 the language to which he objects comes from a 1991 State De-
partment response to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
                                                                                                                      
44. To be clear, of the total civilian deaths, 70 percent were caused by anti-
government elements, 16 percent by pro-government forces, 10 percent unattributed and 
4 percent other. See UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan & UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Afghanistan Mid-Year Report 2015: Protection of Civil-
ians in Armed Conflict, 3 (Aug. 2015), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Count 
ries/AF/UNAMA_Protection_of_Civilians_in_Armed_Conflict_Midyear_Report_2015.d
ocx. 
45. Id. at 8. 
46. Gordon & Perugini, supra note 31. 
47. Adil Ahmad Haque, Human Shields in the DOD Manual: A New Mistake or an Old 
One?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27173/human-
shields-dod-manual-mistake-one/.  
48. Id. The article to which Haque refers is W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of 
War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1 (1990). 
49. Parks’ article is cited elsewhere in the Manual. I would not conclude that the cur-
rent construct is his invention. See DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 15.5.4 n.85. 
50. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Let’s Balance the Argument About the DOD Law of War Manual 
and Targeting, JUST SECURITY (July 10, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24542/lets-
balance-argument-dod-law-war-Manual-targeting/. 
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(ICRC). Unless Parks or the Manual drafters state otherwise, Haque’s con-
tention remains in the realm of imagination. 
Haque also claims that the Manual’s “position” is that “civilians forced 
to serve as human shields can never render an attack unlawfully dispropor-
tionate, no matter how great the expected harm to those civilians or how 
small the anticipated military advantage.”51 Yet nowhere does he cite any 
text that actually states this alleged “position.” More importantly, it diamet-
rically conflicts with the Manual’s many statements requiring attackers—
including where human shields are involved—to use all feasible precau-
tions to prevent harm to civilians.52 
Allow me to clarify my construct for the Manual’s view of human 
shields that considers the proportionality analysis certainly differently than 
Haque, but perhaps even differently that the Manual drafters. Briefly, I sug-
gest that where the object of an attack is the military force employing human 
shields, and the military necessity53 for doing so rests not so much on the 
desire to halt the use of human shields because it is an inhuman and illegal 
action, per se, but rather because the use of human shields has become in a 
given conflict a regularized, explicit and effective method of warfare for a par-
ticular enemy, the calculus necessarily changes, and perhaps even dramati-
cally so.54  
Consequently, the proportionality analysis as to what might be exces-
sive in order to achieve that specific anticipated military advantage (that is, 
halting the enemy’s use of a tactic that may have shown real success in dis-
couraging the use of force against them), would fit within that extant man-
date of the Manual to do everything “feasible” to avoid harm to human 
shields. Put another way, given the military purpose involved, the propor-
tionality calculation could be quite different as to what it may take to end 
the military utility of using human shields—as well as what would be “feasi-
ble” under those circumstances to protect them.55 In short, the assessment 
                                                                                                                      
51. Haque, Human Shields in the DOD Manual, supra note 47. 
52. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.12.3.3.  
53. Regarding “military necessity,” see generally Francoise Hampson, Military Necessity, 
CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/military-necessity/ (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2016). 
54. Cf. Boothby, supra note 30, at 137 (“[T]he proportionality assessment must still be 
undertaken in cases where there are involuntary human shields in the vicinity of intended 
target of the attack, the better view is that the increased numbers of expected civilian cas-
ualties will not necessarily be excessive given the deliberate placing of civilians there.”) 
(citations omitted).   
55. Id. 
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must necessarily take into account the atypical circumstance where the use 
of civilians as human shields intensifies into a significant military advantage 
for an unscrupulous defender. If the utility of human shields—and the 
consequent risk to civilians—is to be blunted, it needs to be unambiguous-
ly established militarily that the use of human shields will not, in fact, pre-
vent an attack on any forces employing them. 
This approach is related to the concept of reprisal, but not contermi-
nous with it. Obviously, it does not involve—or permit—targeting human 
shields directly, but it also does not depend upon determining whether the 
human shields are truly voluntary or not—something that may be a practi-
cal impossibility, especially with respect to aerial attacks. Causing an adver-
sary to abandon this method of warfare can produce a concrete and direct 
military advantage that also serves to protect civilians who might otherwise 
be employed as human shields were the tactic allowed to be effective. 
There are, however, much more orthodox explanations for the Manu-
al’s approach, and that is the time-honored norm of international law that 
there are certain categories of persons—munitions workers for example—
whose proximity to an otherwise legitimate target is “understood not to 
prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule.” 56 Specifically, the Manual 
restates the long-standing U.S. view that a “party that employs human 
shields in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack assumes re-
sponsibility for their injury, provided that the attacker takes feasible precau-
tions in conducting its attack.”57  
Understandably, one might want to distinguish (as this writer would 
like to do) between voluntary and involuntary human shields, but the chaos 
of battlefield reality is such that delineations among civilians are not any 
more feasible to make than would be the case with voluntary/involuntary 
munitions workers. It is also important to recall with respect to voluntari-
ness, the LoW—as Butch Bracknell recently noted—makes no exception 
for non-volunteers conscripted into a belligerent’s armed forces. They are 
subject to targeting under the LoW simply because of their status, even if it 
could be conclusively shown that their military service is involuntary.58 
                                                                                                                      
56. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.12.3.2. 
57. Id., ¶ 5.12.3.3. 
58. Butch Bracknell, Warnings to Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities: Legal Impera-
tive or Ethics-based Policy?, LAWFARE (Nov. 29, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/warn 
ings-civilians-directly-participating-hostilities-legal-imperative-or-ethics-based-policy. Bra-
cknell does indicate that there may be human rights issues with the use of involuntary 
conscripts. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
 
99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Still, under the LoW does an involuntary civilian human shield have dis-
tinct individual rights independent of the behavior of belligerents? No, that 
is simply not how the lex specialis of the LoW works as it mainly concerns 
parties to a conflict, not the private rights of individuals. Even if the LoW 
was somehow rejiggered to be individual human rights-centric, it is not 
clear that the apparently preferred outcome of Haque, Gordon and Peru-
gini for human shields would result. One would also have to consider the 
individual human rights of combatants to live, not to mention the rights of 
civilians who would be imperiled by the continued unrestrained use of hu-
man shields. 
Moreover, critics seem to want a LoW rule that would, in effect, permit 
a clever and unprincipled adversary with access to enough human shields to cre-
ate a legal “fortress” around all or a significant part of his critical military 
capability where virtually any attack would be legally prohibited. To reward 
a belligerent for flaunting the LoW in that way is flatly contrary to the prin-
ciple of international law expressed in the axiom ex injuria non jus oritur or 
“legal rights should not be understood to result from the commission of 
wrongful acts.”  
This does not mean, as Gordon and Perugini seem to fear, that the en-
tire battlespace can be transformed into an area where the normal propor-
tionality rules and other precautions do not apply irrespective of the actual 
location of specific military capabilities. Rather, it is to simply make the 
point that proliferate use of illegal human shields in a militarily significant 
way cannot be allowed to create a force of legally protected military objects 
that cannot be otherwise effectively struck. In this context, the “feasibility” 
determination would take into account how militarily important and effec-
tive the enemy’s use of human shields has become. If their use is sporadic, 
and the impact is only minimal in a particular situation, the “feasibility” 
requirement may markedly limit an attack or even bar it altogether.   
This axiom is particularly relevant here because the critics do not offer 
any option for militaries confronted with the systematized use of human 
shields as a method of war except to expect them to accept whatever set-
backs and even defeats that the illicit tactic can produce. This illegality is 
different from many other violations of the LoW such as, for example, the 
infliction of unnecessary suffering on combatants or even the targeting of 
civilians because it is aimed at achieving a definite and concrete military 
advantage, that is, the protection of military objects, via an illicit method. 
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International law recognizes that States will not accept tactical or, especial-
ly, strategic defeat because of some legal construct that allows a lawbreaker 
to use with impunity a criminal means to achieve victory over them.  
More generally, the law understands that at the end of the day, even 
uniquely unpalatable and undesired actions may nevertheless be required. A 
form of this concept, I would argue, underlays the International Court of 
Justice’s opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case wherein the Court spent con-
siderable time decrying the weapons but finally concluded that they could 
not say their use, as horrific as it might be, would be illegal under extreme 
circumstances.59  
Of course, this is not to imply that the use of human shields would typ-
ically engage the exigencies of nuclear weapons use, but it does illustrate 
the importance of international law—and especially the LoW—remaining 
workable and sensible to law-abiding nations. A good example is how the 
1936 London Charter60 regarding submarine warfare proved impractical in 
combat, and has been subsequently interpreted (not without some contro-
versy) in a way that honorable nations are not disadvantaged.61 Given that 
the law has proven almost totally impotent in restraining today’s adver-
saries who routinely violate LoW in exquisitely barbaric ways, we should be 
very sensitive to—and resistant of—any reading of the LoW that seems to 
result in privileging such lawbreakers because of their lawbreaking. To do so 
would invite the unravelling of the LoW regime if States conclude it pro-
duces such anomalous—and dangerous—results.  
There is no doubt that human shields represent a devilishly complicat-
ed issue with no perfect answers. In many, or most, cases a commander 
would not, for policy reasons, conduct an attack where human shields of 
any type exist. But the Manual principally aims not to make fact-dependent 
policy decisions, but rather to describe what existing law permits.  
We already live in a world where the worst belligerents exhibit a stun-
ning contempt for the LoW, and the Manual—very wisely in my judg-
ment—avoids incentivizing their use of human shields, something that 
would be the inevitable result of the adoption of Haque’s view, as well as 
                                                                                                                      
59. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 105 (July 8). 
60. Procès-Verbal: Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV 
of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, 3 Bevans 298, 
reprinted in 31 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 137 (1939). 
61. See J. Ashley Roach, Legal Aspects of Modern Submarine Warfare, 6 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 379–80 (2002). 
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that of Gordon and Perugini. It is imperative that the LoW not be allowed 
to be manipulated by criminals so as to give de facto immunity to their mili-
tary objectives. Such a situation would leave the fate of civilians to mon-
sters whose very use of human shields clearly illustrates their gross indiffer-
ence to human life.  
 
III. PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK  
 
Professor Haque and I also clashed over his critique of the Manual’s admit-
tedly unartful reading of Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol 1 of the Ge-
neva Conventions (AP I) (to which the United States is not a party).62 It 
deals with precautions commanders must take before attacking in order to 
avoid unnecessary harm to civilians. According to Haque, this Manual pro-
vision, which he seems to understand as a total rejection of the essence of 
Article 57(3), is “both legally and morally unsustainable.”63 His interpreta-
tion is one that the ICRC does not seem to share, but more about that in a 
minute. 
In my response, entitled Let’s Balance the Argument about the DOD Law of 
War Manual and Targeting,64 I began by inviting readers to look at the provi-
sion of the Additional Protocol so they may make their own judgment. The 
text of Article 57(3) provides: 
 
When a choice is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a 
similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the at-
tack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives 
and to civilian objects.65 
 
Here is what the Manual says about that provision: 
 
AP I provides that “[w]hen a choice is possible between several military 
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be 
selected shall be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the 
least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.” The United States has 
                                                                                                                      
62. Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 57(3). 
63. Adil Ahmed Haque, The Defense Department Stands Alone on Target Selection, JUST SE-
CURITY (June 29, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24264/dod-stands-alone-target-
selection/. 
64. Dunlap, Let’s Balance the Argument, supra note 50. This section is largely taken from 
that post. 
65. Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 57(3) (emphasis added). 
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expressed the view that this rule is not a requirement of customary international 
law.66 
 
With respect to the last sentence, the Manual provides a footnote that says 
in substance: 
 
Paragraph 4B(4) contains the language of Article 57(3) of Protocol I, and 
is not a part of customary law. The provision applies “when a choice is 
possible . . . ;” it is not mandatory. An attacker may comply with it if it is 
possible to do so, subject to mission accomplishment and allowable risk, or he may 
determine that it is impossible to make such a determination.67 
 
Haque considers this citation to be a mere “Army statement” (perhaps be-
cause of a misleading footnote in the ICRC customary law study68), but it is 
actually from the Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1991–
1999.69 According to the State Department, the Digest is intended to “pro-
vide the public with a historical record of the views and practice of the 
Government of the United States in public and private international law.”70 
This particular extract is from a January 11, 1991 telegram sent in response 
to a December 1990 memo that the ICRC distributed (to nations who 
might participate in the then pending Gulf war conflict) about the applica-
bility of what the ICRC terms “International Humanitarian Law.” 
In short, the position Haque criticizes is not a recent invention of DoD 
or the Army, but rather has been the view of the U.S. government for al-
most twenty-five years. Equally importantly, consider how the ICRC inter-
prets the U.S. position in its study of customary international law: 
 
Interpretation 
The United States has emphasized that the obligation to select an objective 
the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian 
                                                                                                                      
66. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 5.11.5 (emphasis added).  
67. Id., ¶ 5.11.5 n.303 (emphasis added).  
68. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 67 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts 
& Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIHL Study]. 
69. U.S. Comments on the International Committee of the Red Cross’s Memorandum 
on the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law in the Gulf Region, Jan. 11, 1991, 
reprinted in DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1991–1999, 
2057, 2064 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds., 2005), http://www.state.gov 
/documents/organization/139394.pdf.  
70. Digest of United States Practice in International Law, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2016). 
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lives and to civilian objects is not an absolute obligation, as it only applies “when 
a choice is possible” and thus “an attacker may comply with it if it is possible 
to do so, subject to mission accomplishment and allowable risk, or he 
may determine that it is impossible to make such a determination.”71 
 
In other words, the ICRC does not relate the U.S. view as a wholesale rejec-
tion of the “obligation” but says that the view is merely an interpretation ex-
plicating the precise circumstances in which it applies, that is, “when a 
choice is possible.” While the United States had—and continues to have—
many objections to the ICRC study,72 this particular rendition of the U.S. 
view has not drawn complaints from the U.S. government. 
You be the judge, but I do not think that the U.S. common-sense in-
terpretation is “legally and morally unsustainable,” and my bet is that others 
would agree. In fact, this may be why it has not generated much in the way 
of criticism over the years. The interpretation reflects, I would suggest, a 
keen understanding of the realities of war and hard experience in the im-
portance of clarity about something that could easily be misunderstood (as 
it seems, Haque has done). 
However, what may be a bona fide criticism of the Manual is that the 
ICRC interpretation may be a clearer and better explanation of the U.S. 
position, and ought to be considered for adoption in the next iteration of 
the Manual. 
 
IV. MORALITY, HONOR, AND THE COLLAPSE OF RECIPROCITY73  
 
As can already be seen, part of my sparring with Professor Haque over 
human shields and targeting drifted into my objection to his characteriza-
tion of various Manual provisions as “morally unintelligible,” and to the 
charge that the assessments of the Manual’s drafters had “no obvious basis” 
in “morality.”74 I saw these remarks as ad hominem attacks on those who 
                                                                                                                      
71. CIHL Study, supra note 68, at 67 (emphasis added). 
72. John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes, A US Government Response to the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 433 (2007), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets 
/files/other/irrc_866_bellinger.pdf. 
73. This section is taken mainly from the author’s post, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Honor, 
Morality, and the DOD Law of War Manual, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/27094/honor-morality-dod-law-war-manual/.  
74. See Haque, The Defense Department’s Indefensible Position, supra note 10.  
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take a different view as to how to accomplish what seems to be the same 
end sought by Haque: the protection of civilians.75 
Haque countered by insisting that “nowhere in [his] post [does he] 
question the character of the DoD Manual’s authors. [He says that he is] sure 
that they are fine people. Instead, [he] question[s] the soundness of the DoD 
Manual’s position.”76 When I answered by saying that you could not separate 
an attack on the morality of a position, from an attack on the author of it,77 
he responded with a number of contentions, including the view that “[i]f 
morality were subjective—an expression of each individual’s emotions or 
preferences—then, indeed, all moral disagreement would be an exchange 
of personal attacks. However, morality is not subjective but objective, not 
an expression of how we feel but a reflection of how things are.”78 
Still, Haque’s reference to morality is a worthy concern, and one in 
which I do find some of common ground with him when evaluated in a 
slightly different context. Regarding that context, consider the implications 
of what Creighton Professor Sean Watts calls a “significant recalibration” 
of law of war principles in the Manual, and one that “signals a return to 
very broad, generally applicable legal principles in a truer sense.”79 Specifi-
cally, Watts is assessing the fact that while there have been several different 
listings of such principles over the years, the Manual settles upon “[t]hree 
interdependent principles—military necessity, humanity, and honor—[as provid-
ing] the foundation for other law of war principles, such as proportionality 
and distinction, and most of the treaty and customary rules of the law of 
war.”80 
To Watts, the inclusion of “humanity” is “perhaps its most drastic ad-
justment to existing doctrine.”81 He considers that the Manual’s “notion of 
humanity abandons recent refinements of that concept in favor of a more 
general approach.” But what he finds “most surprising” is the Manual’s 
“revival of the principle of honor” (which he uses, as the Manual does, in-
                                                                                                                      
75. Dunlap, Human Shields and the DOD Law of War Manual, supra note 11. 
76. Haque, Human Shields and Proportionality, supra note 25. 
77. Dunlap, Let’s Balance the Argument, supra note 50. 
78. Adil Ahmad Haque, DOD is Still Wrong about Target Selection and Civilians, JUST SE-
CURITY (July 15, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24671/dod-wrong-target-selection-
civilians/.  
79. Sean Watts, The DOD Law of War Manual’s Return to Principles, JUST SECURITY 
(June 30, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24270/dod-law-war-manuals-return-princ 
iples.  
80. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 2.1. 
81. Watts, supra note 79. 
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terchangeably with chivalry).82 Watts says the Manual “sketches honor in 
exceedingly broad terms and applies it to an extensive range of battlefield 
conduct,” but questions the “practical utility of the principle.”83 
Professor Rachel VanLandingham has a harsher assessment saying she 
has a “visceral negative reaction” to the Manual’s “emphasis on honor and 
chivalry.”84 In her mind they are “outdated, chauvinistic, and frankly dis-
tasteful concepts.”85 She also thinks that chivalry “connotes chauvinism, 
elitism, and the inhumanity of the Crusades,” adding that “codes of honor” 
signal “the assumed white, western, Christian superiority of the [era of the 
Crusades].”86 
While some elements of chivalry may have indeed had chauvinistic 
connotations, modern concepts of battlefield honor can and do draw from a 
broader and deeper moral source that underpins the law of war. Professor 
Terry Gill of the University of Amsterdam and the Netherlands Defence 
Academy relates:  
 
Chivalry and martial honour have long been regarded as essential compo-
nents of warrior ethics and military tradition. They are reflected in most 
cultures in one way or another, ranging from Western warrior tradition 
dating back to classic antiquity and medieval chivalry, to the various war-
rior codes of the ancient and medieval Near East, India, China and Japan. 
They also were practiced in various forms by many other cultures outside 
the arc of Eurasian/Mediterranean civilisation, including Native Ameri-
cans and warrior peoples in Africa and the Pacific.87 
 
Michael Ignatieff makes a similar point it his classic book The Warrior's 
Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience where he notes that modern law 
of war conventions “drew upon a deeper moral source—the codes of a 
warrior’s honor.”88 Ignatieff explains that  
 
                                                                                                                      
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Rachel Vanlandingham, The Law of War is Not about Chivalry, JUST SECURITY (July 
20, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24773/laws-war-chivalry/. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Terry Gill, Chivalry: A Principle of the Law of Armed Conflict?, in ARMED CONFLICT 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: IN SEARCH OF THE HUMAN FACE 35 (Mariëlle Matthee, Brigit 
Toebes & Marcel Brus eds., 2013) (citations omitted).  
88. Michael Ignatieff, THE WARRIOR’S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN 
CONSCIENCE 116–17 (1998). 
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Warrior’s honor was both a code of belonging and an ethic of responsi-
bility. Wherever the art of war was practiced, warriors distinguished be-
tween combatants and noncombatants, legitimate and illegitimate targets, 
moral and immoral weaponry, civilized and barbarous usage in the treat-
ment of prisoners and of the wounded. Such codes may have been hon-
ored as often in the breach as in the observance, but without them war is 
not war—it is no more than slaughter.89 
 
Contrary to Watt’s bemusement about the inclusion of honor/chivalry in 
the Manual, and VanLandinghams’s apparent revulsion of it, I find real 
wisdom in what the Manual’s drafters have done. My reasoning is that do-
ing so might help address the vacuum occasioned by the near disappear-
ance of what was once a key supporting pillar of the law of war—
reciprocity—from the kinds of conflicts in which military forces find them-
selves these days. Indeed, Watts and Vanlandingham both allude to today’s 
phenomenon of belligerents who make it part of their way of fighting to 
flaunt non-adherence to the law of war. Witness ISIS’s horrific burning of 
a captive Jordanian pilot,90 and even more appalling, the crucifixion of chil-
dren and their burial of them alive.91 
The increasing irrelevance in practical terms of the concept of reciproc-
ity should be of no small concern to advocates of the rule of law in war. 
Professor Ken Anderson of American University warned not long ago that 
“[o]bligation without reciprocity risks breakdown [of the rules of war] even 
faster where one side is pressed to protect the civilians of both sides put at 
risk because that’s how the other side deliberately wages war, not merely 
from indifference to them.”92 What is more, Anderson ominously predicts 
that in such circumstances: 
 
A system of formal reciprocity in the rules of war (each side has the same 
formal obligations), but also independence of obligation to the rules of 
war (each side’s obligation is independent of what the other side does, in-
                                                                                                                      
89. Id. at 117. 
90. ISIS Video Shows Captured Jordanian Pilot Being Burned Alive, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2014), 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.640631.  
91. Stephanie Nebehay, Islamic State Selling, Crucifying, Burying Children Alive in Iraq—
UN, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2015), http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/04/mideast-crisis-
children-idINKBN0L828E20150204.  
92. Kenneth Anderson, Laurie Blank on Proportionality in the International Law of Targeting, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 31, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/07/31/laurie-blank-on-proportionality-in-the-international-
law-of-targeting/. 
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cluding if the other side violates the rules) over time is likely either to rup-
ture in crisis or else simply have less and less purchase as universal rules.93 
 
Although the Manual still talks gamely of reciprocity,94 it is doubtful that 
many American troops battling today’s depraved foes expect to be treated 
by them as international law would require. How then do commanders and 
their lawyers rationalize lawful behavior to the troops? Can fear of punish-
ment alone do the job? Maybe in some cases, but reinforcing the idea of 
honor and chivalry, which implicitly call upon the individual to do the right 
thing even when the enemy is not, can be an important motivator in mod-
ern war. 
I believe that this is how Haque’s insistent reference to morality, which 
I see as involving honor and chivalry, can best be productively operational-
ized. Although I continue to disagree with how he expresses it at times, his 
underlying concept (as I interpret it anyway) that morality “matters” is 
more than just a philosophical good, but also a practical necessity if we are 
to expect the troops to adhere to the law under circumstances of extreme 
stress in the face of an adversary who cruelly mocks the most basic princi-
ples of the law of war.  
Translating morality, qua morality, into more secular references to hon-
or and chivalry may be a way to broadly and effectively access the warfight-
er’s psychology that one wishes to animate towards law of war compliance. 
 
V. JOURNALISTS 
 
Whatever consternation was produced by any other part of the Manual, 
nothing resulted in more outcry from the Fourth Estate than its references 
to journalists, and to the possibility that circumstances exist where they 
might be considered spies or belligerents. In a breathless editorial—The 
Pentagon’s Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press—The New York Times typified 
criticism by claiming that the Manual would make the work of journalists 
“more dangerous, cumbersome and subject to censorship,” demanding that 
its provisions relating to the “treatment of journalists covering armed con-
flicts . . . should be repealed immediately.”95  
                                                                                                                      
93. Id. 
94. See, e.g., DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 3.6. 
95. Editorial, The Pentagon’s Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/opinion/the-pentagons-danger 
ous-views-on-the-wartime-press.html?_r=0. See also DoD’s Law of War Manual Allows Jour-
 
 
 
The DoD Law of War Manual and its Critics Vol. 92 
 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the Pentagon96 offered a strong defense of this part of the Manu-
al, as did others,97 I found the Times’ deeply-flawed and at times nonsensical 
editorial to unintentionally demonstrate why the public has so little confi-
dence in newspapers these days, particularly when compared to its confi-
dence in the military.98 Indeed, Americans’ trust in the media generally re-
mains at “historical lows.”99 Though the Times itself seems to struggle with 
why this may be,100 the truth is that this editorial is an example of why peo-
ple rightly are skeptical of the media’s ability to get things right. 
In this instance, the Manual lays out the various legal statuses that might 
attach to journalists by saying: “[i]n general, journalists are civilians. How-
ever, journalists may be members of the armed forces, persons authorized 
to accompany the armed forces, or unprivileged belligerents.”101 It empha-
sizes that journalists “are regarded as civilians; i.e., journalism does not con-
stitute taking a direct part in hostilities such that such a person would be 
deprived of protection from being made the object of attack.”102 However, 
                                                                                                                      
nalists to be Held as “Unprivileged Belligerents,” FOX NEWS (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www 
.foxnews.com/us/2015/08/26/dod-law-war-manual-allows-journalists-to-be-held-as-unpr 
ivileged-belligerents/; Rowan Scarborough, New Pentagon Manual Declares Journalists can be 
Enemy Combatants, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2015/jun/21/military-manual-declares-war-on-spies-propagandist/?pag 
e=all; Ernesto Londono, Will the Pentagon Change its Manual on the Law of War?, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/will-the-
pentagon-change-its-manual-on-the-law-of-war/?_r=0; Michael Cochrane, New U.S. Law 
of War Manual has Media Up in Arms, WORLD: DAILY DISPATCHES (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://www.worldmag.com/2015/08/new_u_s_law_of_war_manual_has_media_up_in_
arms; Christophe Deloire, US Department of Defense Must Revise the Law of War Manual, RE-
PORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Aug. 11, 2015), http://en.rsf.org/united-states-us-
department-of-defense-must-11-08-2015,48216.html. 
96. The Law of War Manual: The Pentagon Responds, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 29, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2015/08/law-war-manual-pentago 
n-responds-150829095950357.html. 
97. Alex Loomis, The New York Times is Confused About the Law of War Manual, LAW-
FARE (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-york-times-confused-about-
law-war-manual. 
98. Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP (June 2–7, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.  
99. Americans’ Trust in Media Remains at Historical Low, GALLUP (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/185927/americans-trust-media-remains-historical-low.aspx.  
100. Why Has Trust in the News Media Declined?, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/11/11/why-has-trust-in-the-news-media 
-declined.  
101. DOD MANUAL, supra note 1, ¶ 4.24.  
102. Id., ¶ 4.24.2.  
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it also acknowledges the inarguable truth that there are times when even 
journalists can lose their protection. Specifically, the Manual points out that: 
 
Journalists and Spying. Reporting on military operations can be very simi-
lar to collecting intelligence or even spying. A journalist who acts as a spy 
may be subject to security measures and punished if captured. To avoid 
being mistaken for spies, journalists should act openly and with the per-
mission of relevant authorities. Presenting identification documents, such 
as the identification card issued to authorized war correspondents or oth-
er appropriate identification, may help journalists avoid being mistaken as 
spies.103 
 
As I pointed out in an op-ed, The New York Times, Dangerously Uninformed, vs. 
the Military,104 the Times is apparently unaware that the Manual does little 
more than lay out what the Geneva Conventions and other legal authorities 
have provided for decades. For example, the Times’ editors decry the fact 
that the Manual notes that when journalists relay to adversaries “infor-
mation of immediate use in combat operations,” such real-time and direct 
support of enemy warfighting efforts might jeopardize the protected status 
journalists normally enjoy.105 This is nothing new. The International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) makes clear that journalists are protected 
like other civilians,106 but not “for such time as they take a direct part in 
hostilities”—language which is itself taken directly from the 1977 Protocol 
I to the Geneva Conventions.107 
So what would constitute direct participation for a journalist? The Times 
ridicules the Manual for having what it calls a “vaguely-worded standard” in 
this regard.108 Actually, the ICRC itself uses “transmitting tactical targeting 
                                                                                                                      
103. Id., ¶ 4.24.4.  
104. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The New York Times, Dangerously Uninformed, vs. the Military, 
THE HILL (Aug. 13, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/251007-the-
new-york-times-dangerously-uninformed-vs-the-military. Much of this section is taken 
from the op-ed in The Hill. 
105. The Pentagon’s Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press, supra note 95. 
106. Robin Geiss, How does International Humanitarian Law Protect Journalists in Armed-
Conflict Situations?, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (July 27, 2010), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/protection-journalists-
interview-270710.htm.  
107. Protocol I, supra note 27, art. 51(3).  
108. The Pentagon’s Dangerous Views on the Wartime Press, supra note 95. 
 
 
 
The DoD Law of War Manual and its Critics Vol. 92 
 
110 
 
 
 
 
 
 
intelligence for a specific attack” as one example of direct participation.109 
Put another way, the Manual’s illustration virtually mirrors the substance of 
the ICRC’s assessment—something the Times could have easily discovered 
if they had exercised a modicum of due diligence. 
One has to wonder whether anyone (other than the Times’ editors) real-
ly believes that journalists have some kind of unfettered right to broadcast 
to ISIS militants or whomever might be listening that, for example, a clan-
destine military operation to rescue human shields is about to get under-
way? 
The Times also obviously resents that anyone would even suggest that a 
journalist might be involved in spying. In truth, it is hardly a news flash110 
that spies have long used the “journalist” sobriquet as a cover.111 In fact, in 
reporting the death in 2013 of Austin Goodrich, a former CBS reporter-
cum-spy, the Times itself admits that he was “far from the only journalist 
doubling as a secret agent” in the 1950s and 1960s.112 Is the Times really so 
naive to think that in today’s world where adversaries are willing to bury 
children alive,113 they would be squeamish about using journalists as secret 
agents? 
It is not hard to figure out why journalists could be effective spies. Af-
ter all, international law defines spying as “when [someone] acting clandes-
tinely or on false pretenses . . . obtains or endeavors to obtain information 
in the zone of operations of a belligerent . . . with the intention of com-
municating it to the hostile party.”114 Is not a journalist someone who “ob-
tains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations”? For 
its part, the American Press Institute (API) defines journalism as “the activ-
ity of gathering, assessing, creating, and presenting news and infor-
                                                                                                                      
109. Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions & Answers, INTERNATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE OF THE RED CROSS (June 2, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/doc 
uments/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm.  
110. RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33715, COVERT ACTION: AN 
EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY? (1996). 
111. Murray Seeger, Spies and Journalists: Taking a Look at Their Intersections, NIEMAN 
REPORTS (Sept. 11, 2009), http://niemanreports.org/articles/spies-and-journalists-taking-
a-look-at-their-intersections/.  
112. Bruce Weber, Austin Goodrich, Spy Who Posed as Journalist, Dies at 87, NEW YORK 
TIMES, July 15, 2015, at A15.  
113. Stephanie Nebehay, supra note 91.  
114. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to 
Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 29, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539. 
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mation.”115 One need not be a military expert to realize that the API defini-
tion reflects much the same skill set as that of a military intelligence officer. 
In short, the Manual’s concern about journalists is hardly unreasonable. 
The ICRC understands that it is a real possibility that a journalist might 
actually be an intelligence operative, and simply insists that a journalist so 
suspected must not be subject to arbitrary detention, and must be given a 
fair trial.116 The Manual is, of course, fully supportive of such humane 
treatment. 
In addition, the Times’ editorial reveals a blissful ignorance about the 
impact of modern technologies on battlefield reporting. A new study by the 
Royal Danish Defense College regarding the “weaponization of social me-
dia” gives examples as to how today’s press reporting is being exploited by 
terrorist organizations in combat: 
 
Internet (live streamed news reports on web-TV) and social network me-
dia (e.g., Journalists tweeting from crisis areas) [are] also being used by 
non-state actors without sophisticated Intelligence Surveillance and Re-
connaissance (ISR) assets to conduct Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) 
of, e.g., their rocket attacks.117 
 
In other words, even the most well-meaning journalist might be inadvert-
ently aiding the enemy. This illustrates that, yes, there are instances where it 
is necessary to temporarily restrain reporting—even by bona fide journal-
ists. This is completely legal, and not just under international law: The U.S. 
Supreme Court has never found that the First Amendment entitles journal-
ists or anyone else to communicate to the enemy real-time information it 
can readily use to fight U.S. troops.118 
Why? The court has held that it is “obvious and unarguable” that “no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Na-
tion.”119 Indeed, in the 2010 case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the 
court upheld as consistent with the First Amendment the actual criminaliza-
                                                                                                                      
115. What is Journalism?, AMERICAN PRESS INSTITUTE, http://www.americanpressin 
stitute.org/journalism-essentials/what-is-journalism/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2015).  
116. CIHL Study, supra note 68, at 118.  
117. Thomas Elkjer Nissen, #THEWEAPONIZATIONOFSOCIALMEDIA: @CHARA-
CTERISTICS_OF_CONTEMPORARY_CONFLICTS 83–84 (2015), http://www.fak.dk/publika 
tioner/Documents/The%20Weaponization%20of%20Social%20Media.pdf. 
118. William A. Wilcox, Jr., Security Reviews of Media Reports on Military Operations: A Re-
sponse to Professor Lee, THE ARMY LAWYER, Nov. 2004, at 10.  
119. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).  
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tion of the conveyance of relatively benign and unclassified legal infor-
mation to designated terrorist organizations.120 
The Times also arrogates to itself the right to declare who is or is not a 
journalist. When a Pentagon official raised the example of the assassination 
of the Afghan military commander Ahmad Shah Massoud in September 
2001 by assassins who posed as television journalists, the Times editors 
scoffed that “[t]hey were not, in fact, journalists.”121 In the real world, how-
ever, determining who is or is not a journalist is not an easy thing, especial-
ly given that anyone with access to a social media can describe him or her-
self as a “citizen journalist.”122 These are, we are told, private individuals 
who “do essentially what professional reporters do.”123 
Accordingly, although the Times objects mightily to a journalist accredi-
tation process, should any “citizen journalist” with a Twitter account be 
allowed to traipse around a battlefield transmitting whatever sensitive mili-
tary activity interests him or her? Furthermore, is not some vetting appro-
priate in light of the Massoud incident? Again, even a cursory examination 
of Additional Protocol I clearly shows that it contemplates that it will be a 
government—not the Times or any newspaper—that “attests” to a person’s 
“status as a journalist.”124 
I concluded my op-ed by observing that the United States needs a fully 
informed, robust and courageous media, particularly during wartime. And it 
needs reporters on the battlefield who are willing to accurately represent 
the facts to the public. The press, however, cannot deem itself above the 
Constitution or the international law to which America has bound itself. 
Nor can it be insensitive to the needs of those this country sends in harms’ 
way. Denigrating the military simply because its Manual reflects the law as it 
exists is a formula for the further loss of confidence of the American peo-
ple in their newspapers and other journalistic endeavors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
120. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
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VI. CYBER 
 
One of the most interesting sections of the Manual (and not the first time 
about which this writer is commenting125) is Chapter 16 on Cyber Operations. 
What is remarkable is not so much anything dramatically new in the text, 
but rather that it was included at all. For many years, almost everything 
about cyber, other than that which related to purely defensive cyber mat-
ters, was classified; indeed, the Pentagon’s joint doctrine was only declassi-
fied in 2014.126 What discussion of the U.S. view of law in this area that ex-
isted in official venues was mainly based on a long-available 1999 U.S. De-
partment of Defense General Counsel (GC) memorandum,127 and the 
ground-breaking 2012 speech by Harold Koh, then legal advisor to the U.S. 
State Department.128  
The Manual’s chapter on cyber operations hews to the earlier DoD 
memo and the Koh speech in virtually all particulars. Controversy may ex-
ist, however, in at least two areas. Specifically, the Manual diverges a bit 
from what many scholars believe is the proverbial “gold” standard, the 
highly respected Tallinn Manual (which it does not even cite). An effort of 
international experts, under the auspices of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence, the Tallinn Manual attempts to capture and 
interpret the extant international law applicable to cyber.129  
To be sure, the Manual and the Tallinn Manual are in accord in many re-
spects,130 but the two documents part ways on the issue of the degree of 
                                                                                                                      
125. Charlie Dunlap, Cyber Operations and the New Defense Department Law of War Manu-
al: Initial Impressions, LAWFARE (June 15, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-
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in Cyberspace, Address to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 
2012), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm.  
129. THE TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
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force that is necessary to trigger the right of self-defense under Article 51 
of the UN Charter.131 The Tallinn Manual takes the view of most interna-
tional law scholars that the prohibition on the “use of force,” found in Ar-
ticle 2(4) of the Charter,132 is different from what might constitute an 
“armed attack” under Article 51. The Manual, however, takes the posi-
tion—as reflected in the Koh speech—“that the inherent right of self-
defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force.”133 
In addition, while traditionally an “armed attack” necessarily involved 
some degree of violence and destruction, the Manual suggests that this may 
not always be the case. Specifically, it uses as an example of a cyber opera-
tion that would “cripple a military’s logistics systems, and thus its ability to 
conduct and sustain military operations” as an incident that might be “con-
sidered a use of force under jus ad bellum.”134 Other scholars, like Schmitt, 
also seem to be acknowledging that significant cyber events may have an 
effect so severe that States will consider them the equivalent of an armed 
attack even in the absence of direct, physical destruction as is the case with 
more traditional weaponry, even though the boundaries may not be clear.135 
Schmitt says that “[s]hutting down the national economy is probably an act 
of war, but short of that, we’re not certain.”136 
Despite having been published since June of 2015, many pundits seem 
unaware of this chapter of the Manual. For example, in September of 2015, 
an op-ed appeared asserting that in cyber a “new battlefield has emerged 
                                                                                                                      
131. Charter of the United Nations, art. 51, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031. Article 51 
provides: 
 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the Unit-
ed Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of 
this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems 
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
132. Id., art. 2(4). That article provides: “All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.” 
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that has anonymous combatants, civilian targets and no established rules.”137 
Actually, as both the Manual and the Tallinn Manual make clear, there are 
rules, but ascertaining the facts by which to apply those rules can be diffi-
cult in the cyber arena. Still, as Schmitt concedes, circumstances can arise 
where the legal answers are not yet clear.138 This is especially true regarding 
hostile cyber incidents below the threshold of “force,” so we can expect 
further developments in future editions of the Manual.139 
Even more significant is a letter from several congressmen to the State 
Department insisting that “[n]ow is the time for the international commu-
nity to seriously respond again with a binding set of international rules for 
cyberwarfare: an E-Neva Convention.”140 
Perhaps the issue is that although the Manual sketches out the DoD’s 
view of the law, it does not provide a “cookbook” setting out the legal sta-
tus for every possible cyber incident. As Admiral Rogers pointed out in 
recent testimony, the DoD is still “still working [its] way through” what 
constitutes an “act of war” in a given situation.141 That is understandable, 
but even if the Manual never becomes a cookbook (as it never should be), it 
should be amended as more detailed guidance becomes available. In this 
respect, the Manual is more of a beginning, than a finished state of the U.S. 
view of the law of cyber operations. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
This short article by no means examined all of the Manual’s critiques, let 
alone all the thoughtful dialogue it engendered. For example, Army Re-
serve Major Patrick Walsh’s examination of the Manual led him to make an 
                                                                                                                      
137. Daniel Reidel, New Rules Needed for Digital War, FEDERAL TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015), 
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138. Fairchild, supra note 135 (quoting Michael Schmitt). 
139. Outside the Manual process, a “Tallinn 2.0” effort is underway to address this 
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interesting call to correct what he terms as a “major flaw” in the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice as he believes it has “no provision for command 
responsibility.”142 I am not sure I agree with him as Articles 18 and 21 of 
the Code do provide for courts-martial jurisdiction for violations of the 
“law of war,” which would include offenses related to command responsi-
bility.143  
Professor Jordan Paust points out that the Supreme Court has on more 
than one occasion concluded that Congress has included, in language very 
similar to that of the current Code, the authority to try offenses arising un-
der the law of war.144 Accordingly, I think that with innovative charging, an 
appropriate law of war crime based on command responsibility can be pur-
sued within the existing parameters of the Code.  
Another interesting critique comes from the highly-respected law of 
war expert Professor Geoffrey Corn.145 Corn found it “perplexing” that the 
Manual did not elevate the LoW obligation “to take all feasible precautions 
to mitigate the risk to civilians” from a “mere rule” to “a fundamental prin-
ciple” of the LoW. Candidly, it is not perplexing to me because while the 
Manual has shown some fresh thinking regarding precautions to be taken 
during attacks,146 it is still essentially a lex lata, as opposed to a lex feranda, 
document. His proposal is just not reflective of the vast majority of inter-
pretations of the LoW’s fundamental principles.147 More specifically, it is 
hard to see how it might affect the actual practice of the LoW, except per-
haps to obscure the point that it is “excessive” civilian casualties that the 
LoW focuses upon. In fact, in the current war against ISIS, credible reports 
                                                                                                                      
142. Patrick Walsh, The DOD Law of War Manual and Command Responsibility: Is it Time 
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143. Uniform Code of Military Justice, arts. 18, 21 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821). 
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Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law (Oct. 16, 2015) (on file 
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about unwarranted caution about civilian casualties (that is, beyond what 
the LoW requires) “is sparking a crisis in confidence that has invited fur-
ther violence emboldening others to take action not aligned with U.S. in-
terests.”148  
Nevertheless, these essays and others are the sort of thought-provoking 
dialogue one hopes the Manual will produce. They suggest that the Manual 
will likely become something of a “living” document. As already noted, by 
its own terms it solicits feedback, and explicitly preserves the idea that the 
views it contains will evolve.149 As new weapons, new strategies and new 
adversaries emerge, we can—and should—expect to see just such an evolu-
tion. After all, as the Nuremberg Tribunal observed, the “law is not static, 
but by continual adaption follows the needs of a changing world.”150 
Still, it remains to be seen the degree to which the Manual influences 
the development of the law of war. Professor Eric Jensen of Brigham 
Young Law School expresses concern that the Manual officially bills itself 
as merely providing “information on the law of war to DOD personnel 
responsible for implementing the law of war and executing military opera-
tions,” instead of aggrandizing for itself a more directive mantle of defini-
tive guidance.151 He also seems displeased that the Manual states that it 
“does not necessarily reflect the views of any other department or agency 
of the U.S. Government or the views of the U.S. Government as a whole” 
as this may undermine its value as opinio juris.152 
While Jensen’s criticisms are thoughtful and important, I think that the 
language that concerns him is simply bureaucratic conventions required to 
end the lengthy interagency coordination process that reportedly stalled the 
Manual’s publication for so long.153 I would expect that the Manual will ra-
ther quickly become considered the definitive statement of the United 
States on the LoW. Because the United States has so much practical expe-
rience in warfighting, and especially in the complex conflicts of the twenty-
                                                                                                                      
148. Deptula, supra note 43.  
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first century, I would be surprised if other nations do not also find it to be 
the most influential document of its genre.  
Allow me to close by paraphrasing what I said about another law of 
war manual154 because I believe it to be equally (or more) applicable here: 
 
[E]fforts like the drafting of the [DoD] Manual are but one part of the 
overall preparation for lawful, ethical combat. The [DoD] Manual can be 
instrumental not just to protecting the lives of innocent civilians, or even 
to defending the perquisites of states, per se. It can also help to provide a 
degree of confidence, if not comfort, to those who are asked by their na-
tion to perform the most difficult of tasks under the most demanding of 
circumstances. For this, if nothing else, the enormous effort that pro-
duced the [DoD] Manual finds its justification.155 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
154. The Program on Humanitarian and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2013).  
155. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law of War Manuals and the Warfighting Perspective, 47(2) 
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 276 (2012). 
